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1 Introduction
This paper constructs a two-country and two-factor trade equilibriummodelwith
heterogeneous firms to investigate the impacts of minimum wages on firms’ ex-
ports. In our model, firms are heterogeneous in productivity. A firm must pay a
fixed entry cost before it observes its productivity, which is ex ante random. After
that, it decides whether or not to start production. In the latter case another fixed
production cost is incurred. The firm employs capitals and labors to produce its
variety, where the price of capital is determined by the market while that of la-
bor is exogenously determined and is usually above its equilibrium level. In this
situation, labor market does not clear. The firm can decide to export its product
to the foreign market or not. In the former case it has to pay another exporting
fixed cost. According to the above setting, we find that the increase of the domes-
ticminimumwage decreases firms’ exporting possibilities by selection effect (i.e.,
forcing low-productivity firms to exit the market) and decreases firms’ exporting
sales by increasing their unit production costs. Moreover, firms’ productivity has
positive impacts on their exports.
Wealso apply firm-level data from the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms cross-
sectional data collected by the National Bureau of Statistics of China between
1998 and 2007 to estimate the impacts of domestic minimum wage and firms’
productivity on their exports. We first estimate each firm’s productivity in each
year for each industry and then regress firms’ exports with respect to their pro-
ductivity, minimum wages, industrial capital stocks and other control variables.
The empirical results verify our theoretic results. Specifically, firms’ exporting
probability decreases by 1.5%while their exporting sales decreases by 9% if mini-
mumwages doubles.
The rest of this paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 reviews the literatures
on the relationship between minimum wage and international trade. Section 3
introduces the closed-economy model with heterogeneous firms and minimum
wages. Section 4 analyzes the open-economymodel and the impact of minimum
wages on firms’ exports. Empirical models are introduced in Section 5. Section 6
gives a brief description of the data used in this paper. Empirical results are stated
in Section 7. Section 8 concludes the paper.
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2 Literature review
Literatures on the relationship betweenminimumwages and international trade
can be classified into two groups. One considers the case that inter-industry
wages are distorted while real wages are flexible. The other considers the case
that all industrial wages are distorted. Hagen (1958), Bhagwati and Ramaswami
(1963) and Magee (1976) investigated the first case. Summarizing their findings,
we can see that the increase of the minimum wage in an industry leads to the
increase of capital intensity and the decrease of outputs within this industry and
the decrease of capital intensities and the increase of outputs in other industries
if capitals are industry-specific and labors are mobile across industries. This im-
plies that the increase of the minimum wage in an industry leads to the increase
of exports in this industry and the decrease of imports in labor-intense industries
if the country exports capital-intense and import labor-intense goods before the
change of minimumwages, Vice versa. If labors are not mobile across industries,
then the results still hold as before. However, unemployment occurs in the indus-
try whose minimumwage increases.
Haberler (1950), Brecher (1974a,b) investigated the second case. Brecher (1974a,b)
analyzed the casewith two countries, two goods, two factors and constant-return-
to-scale production technologies. They showed that the increase of theminimum
wage in a labor-abundant country decreases the exports of labor-intensive goods
and increases the exports of capital-intensive goods. The situation is reversed if
the country is capital-abundant. The decrease of the minimum wage in a coun-
try may lead the reverse of trade directions. That is, the country may change to
import capital-intensive while export labor-intensive goods. Their models were
extended to the case with multiple goods and multiple factors by Schweinberg-
er (1978), where the number of goods and that of factors are equal. Based on
Schweinberger (1978)’s idea, Brecher (1980) considered a small-country open e-
conomy with three factors (capital, labor and land) and two goods. It found that
the increase of the minimum wage in a country will increase the exports of both
capital-intensive and labor-intensive goods if the country specializes incomplete-
ly, the production technologies of the two goods are constant return to scale and
one good is more capital-intensive and more labor-intensive. Neary (1985) fur-
ther investigated the case that the number of factors are larger than that of goods
and concluded similar results to those given in Brecher (1974a,b).
The above findingsmay change if the interaction effects between endowment
and trade structure are involved into consideration. Flug and Galor (1986) con-
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structed a general equilibrium with two countries, two goods and two factors
(skilled and unskilled labors) , where an unskilled labor can change to skilled
labor by accumulating human capitals. It showed that the increase of the min-
imumwage on the unskilled labors in a small country leads to the increase of the
exports of skilled-labor-intensive goods if this country specializes incompletely.
The result is reversed if the country exports unskilled-labor-intensive goods. The
case for large countries is a little different. If the country exports unskilled-labor-
intensive good at first, then the increase of the minimum wage on the unskilled
labors may reverse the trade structure. When the minimum wage is sufficiently
high, the country will specialize in the production of and export the skilled-labor-
intensive goods in the short run and its exports will keep increasing in the long
run.
The above researches are based on the assumption of homogeneous firms and
their results are only industry-level. Firms’ heterogeneity needs to be considered
to investigate the impacts of minimum wages on individual firms’ exporting be-
haviors. However, this can not be done under the frameworks of the Ricardian
model, the Heckscher-Ohlin theory and the new trade theory. 1 In fact, few lit-
eratures are focusing on this topic. This paper constructs a trade equilibrium
model with heterogeneous firms andminimumwages to investigate the impacts
of minimum wages on firms’ exports. Different from Melitz (2003), countries in
our model are asymmetric and the number of factors is two (capital and labor).
Because of the minimumwages on labor are above their market-equilibrium lev-
els, only the capital markets clears. Our model is also different from that in Egger
et al. (2009), in which there is only one production factor (labor) and there is one
final good and many intermediate goods whose number is endogenously deter-
mined. Moreover, it did not investigate the impact of minimum wages on firms’
exports. According to our model, we get the followingmain result: the increase of
domestic minimumwagewill decrease all firms’ exporting probabilities and their
exporting sales.
1 Many empirical results since 1990s have shown that firms in the same industry in a country
have different exporting behaviors. First, exporters are relatively few among all firms in an in-
dustry. Second, exporters are relatively more larger and more productive. Third, most exporters
exports only a small part of their outputs. Fourth, exporters’ performance variables affect sig-
nificantly and positively their exports. Fifth, exporters have higher wages and higher innovation
levels. Please refer to Tybout (2003) for a survey of these literatures andMelitz (2003) and Bernard
et al. (2003) for theories developed to explain these phenomena.
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3 Closed economywithminimumwage and
heterogeneous firms
In the economy we investigate are there two countries (i.e., the domestic and the
foreign country, denoted byH and F , respectively). In each country, there areM
monopolistically competitive industries. We assume that each variety in each of
which is produced by only one firm. Suppose that there areNl andN
∗
l firms in in-
dustry l inH and F , respectively (hereafter we use ”*” to index the corresponding
variables of F ). The production of each variety uses two factors, the capital (K)
and the labor (L), where K is industry-specific, which is only mobile within the
same industry, while L is mobile across industries. As this paper does not inves-
tigate the impact of country size on firms’ exports, we assume that each country
is normalized with one unit of infinitely divisible labor. Suppose that the prefer-
ences of consumers of both countries are the same, which can be represented by
the following utility function
U =
M∏
l=1
(∫ Nl
0
xρlli di
) βl
ρl
, 0 < βl, ρl < 1,
M∑
l=1
βl = 1, (1)
where βl represents the share of consumption in industry l among total consump-
tion expenditure, ρl =
σl−1
σl
, σl is the substitution elasticity between varieties in
industry l and xli is the consumption of variety i in industry l. Suppose that each
consumer’s income comes only from his wage w.2 As what we investigate is the
impact of minimum wage standard on firms’ exports, i.e., the labor wage in the
economy shall be larger than or equal to theminimumwage, wemake the follow-
ing assumption.
Assumption 1 The minimumwages are higher than or equal to the market equi-
librium wages in H and F , respectively. Moreover, they are set so that each con-
sumer in the two countries can get at least the minimumwage income.
Our rationale to make Assumption 1 is as follows. If the minimum wage in
a country is lower than the market wage, then it has no impact on the market
equilibria, and thus we do not need to consider it. Furthermore, if the minimum
wage can not guarantee that all the labors’s expected incomes are higher than it,
2When the firms’ entry attains its equilibrium, their expected profits are zero, so that each
consumer’s capital income is 0.
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then the minimumwage standard is of no sense.3
Under Assumption 1, unemployment occurs in the economy as the minimum
wage are larger than the market equilibrium wage. As firms are rational, they
must pay the labors the minimum wage if there’s no incomplete information or
labor market sticky or other institutional barriers.
In this section, we only consider the home country. Let the price index in
industry l be Pl, where Pl =
(∫ Nl
0
p1−σlli di
) 1
1−σl , l = 1, · · · ,M . Then the demand qli
for and the expenditure rli on variety i in industry l are, respectively,
qli = Ql
(
pli
Pl
)
−σl
, rli = Rl
(
pli
Pl
)1−σl
, l = 1, · · · ,M, (2)
where Ql =
βlw
Pl
is the total consumption and Rl = PlQl = βlw is the total expen-
diture on varieties in industry l in the economy.
As all industries have similar monopolistic competitive market structure, we
only consider the representative firm’s behaviors in industry l, and thus ignore the
firm-index i in the sequel. Suppose the representative firm’s production function
is Y = θKαlL1−αl (herein the capital-output elasticity αl varies with industries),
where Y,K, L are, respectively, the firm’s output, capital and labor hired, and θ is
its productivity. In each industry l, firms’ productivity is heterogeneous. Suppose
that the distribution function of firms’ productivity in industry l is of the following
form:
Gl(θ) =

 1− (bl/θ)
kl θ ≥ bl,
0 else,
(3)
where bl > 0 is the lower bound and kl > 2 is the shape parameter of Gl(θ), which
measures the concentration degree of firms’ productivity distribution in industry
l.
Each firm does not know its productivity level before it enters into the mar-
ket. It observes its productivity θ after it pays the industry-specific fixed entry
cost Fl, which is invested in the form of entrepreneur spirit but is measured by
money.4 After it observes its productivity, the firm needs to decide whether or not
3Theminimumwage standard which is higher than the market equilibrium wage always leads
to unemployment, and thus each labor’s income is equal to the unemployment rate times the
minimumwage.
4Here we assume that entrepreneur spirits are supplied without elasticity. It’s worthy to point
out that analysis will be much more complicated if the fixed entry cost Fl is invested in the form
of labor or capital.
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to produce and sell its variety. In the former case, another fixed production cost
fl is incurred, which is also invested in the form of entrepreneur spirit but is mea-
sured by money. If the firm begins to produce and sell its variety, it is faced with
the demand function given in (2). Thus, its optimal capital and labor inputs are,
respectively,
K = ρσll P
σl
l Ql̟
1−σl
l θ
σl−1
(
rl
αl
)
−1
, L = ρσll P
σl
l Ql̟
1−σl
l θ
σl−1
(
w
1− αl
)
−1
, (4)
where̟l =
(
rl
αl
)αl (
w
1−αl
)1−αl
is the unit production cost of varieties in industry l.
Therefore, the firms’ optimal output and pricing rule are, respectively,
ql = ρ
σl
l P
σl
l Ql̟
−σl
l θ
σl , pl =
̟l
ρlθ
. (5)
(5) implies that: (1) a firm’s output is higher and its price is lower, the higher is its
productivity; (2) a firm’s output is lower and its price is higher, the higher is the
industrial unit production cost ̟l. The net profit of the firm with productivity θ
in industry l in each period is
πl = (1− ρl)Dl − fl, (6)
where Dl = Mlθ
σl−1 is the firm’s domestic sale andMl = ρ
σl−1
l P
σl
l Ql̟
1−σl
l . Define
the weighted productivity level as θ˜l =
[∫ +∞
0
θσl−1µl(θ)dθ
] 1
σl−1 , where µl(θ) is the
density function of productivity distribution of incumbents in industry l. Then
we have
Pl = N
1
1−σl
l
̟l
ρlθ˜l
, Ql = N
1
1−σl
l
βlρlwθ˜l
̟l
. (7)
The firm decides to produce only if πl ≥ 0, from which we can get Dl and θl,
the cut-offs of firms’ domestic sales and their productivity (such that the profit of
the firms withDl is zero):
Dl = σlfl, θl =
(
σlfl
βlw
) 1
σl−1
N
1
σl−1
l θ˜l. (8)
This implies that the productivity cut-off θl is higher, the higher is the industrial
weighted productivity level θ˜l.
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According to the relationship between the ex post productivity distribution
µl(θ) and the ex ante one gl(θ), and also by the form ofGl(θ), we rewrite the indus-
trial weighted productivity level θ˜l as
θ˜l(θl) =
(
kl
kl + 1− σl
) 1
σl−1
θl. (9)
Substituting (9) into (8), we can solve the equilibrium number of firmsNl as:
Nl =
βlw
σlfl
kl + 1− σl
kl
. (10)
This implies that the number of firms in the industry in equilibrium is larger, the
larger is the minimumwage.
As the minimum wage is fixed above the market equilibrium wage, only the
capital market clears in equilibrium. Substituting (8), (9) and (10) into the clear-
ing condition of capital market, we can solve the equilibrium interest of the capi-
tal in industry l:
rl
αl
= ρlβlwK¯
−1
l , (11)
which implies that the lower minimumwage and the higher capital stock lead to
the higher interest of the capital in industry. This indicates that the increase of the
minimumwage will increase the industrial unit production cost̟l, which can be
simplified as̟l = (βlρl)
αl(1− αl)
−(1−αl)K¯−αll w.
Substituting (11) into (7), we can get the equilibrium expressions of Pl andQl,
respectively, as follows:
Pl = N
1
1−σl
l β
αl
l ((1− αl)ρl)
−(1−αl)K¯−αll wθ˜
−1
l , Ql = N
1
1−σl
l (βlρl(1− αl))
1−αlK¯αll θ˜l. (12)
Moreover, by (10), (12) and (6), we can find the equilibrium output of the firm
with productivity θ in industry l as
ql =
ρlklσlfl
kl + 1− σl
θσl θ˜1−σll ̟
−1
l , (13)
which implies that the firm’s output is higher, the higher is its productivity and
the lower is the minimumwage.
The free entry condition implies that each firm’s ex ante expected net profit
upon entry shall be zero, which determines the equilibrium number of incum-
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bents in the industry. The entry condition can be written as follows:
1−Gl(θl)
δl
fl


(
θ˜(θl)
θl
)σl−1
− 1

 = Fl, (14)
where δl is the survival probability of firms in each period in industry l. As Gl is
given by (3), we can get the equilibrium productivity cut-off θl as follows:
θl =
(
fl
δlFl
σl − 1
kl + 1− σl
)1/kl
bl. (15)
According to (15) and the expression of θ˜(θl), we know that both industrial pro-
ductivity cut-off and industrial weighted productivity are not affected by themin-
imumwage level.
According to (9), (10), (15) and the fact σl > 1, (12) implies that industrial
price index Pl and industrial output Ql are higher, the higher is the minimum
wage. One interesting result is that industrial output is positively correlated with
theminimumwage, which implies that consumers’ total consumption andhence
their welfare increaseswith the increase of theminimumwage in the closed econ-
omy under Assumption 1.5 This result conflicts with our intuition, as the increase
of the minimum wage increases firms’ unit production costs. However, it holds
because the increase of the minimum wage increases consumers’ demand and
hence industrial output.
Summarizing the above discussion, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In the closed economy and under Assumption 1, the increase of the
minimum wage will increase industrial capital interest, industrial unit produc-
tion cost, industrial price index, industrial output, and the equilibrium number
of firms in the industry. Moreover, it will decease each firm’s output and increase
their pricing rules. However, it does not change industrial productivity cut-off and
industrial weighted productivity level.
Wecan explain the latter part of Proposition 1 as follows. Under Assumption 1,
all labors get the minimumwage. Though the increase of the minimumwage in-
creases firms’ unit production costs and thus the industrial price index, it increas-
es faster than the industrial price index, and thus consumers’ purchasing powers
5 It seems that this result will cause the following paradox - the increase of the minimumwage
will increase infinitely consumers’ welfare. This paradox is caused by Assumption 1. But this
assumption holds conditionally, i.e., the total output are enough to pay each consumer the mini-
mumwage. However, this condition will be broken when the minimumwage is set enough high.
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increase, which attracts more firms to enter into the market. Furthermore, as al-
l firms are faced with the same increasing unit production cost, the increase of
the minimumwage does not change the industrial productivity cut-offs and thus
does not change the industrial weighted productivity levels.
Although Proposition 1 holds in the closed economy, it does not hold in the
open economy. In the latter case, firms in the home country are faced with differ-
ent increasing competition pressures from those in the foreign country - the com-
petition power of domestic firms decreases while that of foreign firms increases.
Under free trade, the increase of the domestic minimum wage will increase in-
dustrial productivity cut-offs and hence industrial weighted productivity levels.
4 The impact of theminimumwage on the exports of
heterogeneous firms
4.1 Equilibrium in the open economy
Firms in industry l must pay a fixed exporting cost κl to enter into the foreign
market. Suppose the iceberg transportation cost is τl for transporting one unit of
good from the home country to the foreignmarket. For simplification, we assume
that the corresponding variables κ∗l and τ
∗
l in the foreign country are, respectively,
equal to those in the home country. Then the exporting profit of the firm with
productivity θ in industry l in the home country is:
πXl = max
{
0, (1− ρl)M
∗
Xlθ
σl−1 − κl
}
, (16)
where M∗Xl = ρ
σl−1
l P
∗σl
l Q
∗
l̟
1−σl
l τ
1−σl
l , and P
∗
l and Q
∗
l are, respectively, foreign in-
dustrial price index and foreign total output in industry l. The firm chooses to
export only if πXl ≥ 0, from which we can get the domestic and foreign exporting
productivity cut-offs in industry l, as follows:
θXl = (N
∗
l +NXl)
1
σl−1
κ
1
σl−1
l ρlτl
̟l
̟∗
l
[(1− ρl)βlw∗]
1
σl−1
θ˜∗T l, (17)
θ∗Xl = (Nl +N
∗
Xl)
1
σl−1
κ
1
σl−1
l ρlτl
̟∗
l
̟l
[(1− ρl)βlw]
1
σl−1
θ˜T l,
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where θ˜T l and θ˜
∗
T l are the domestic and foreign aggregate productivity, respective-
ly, which have the following forms:
θ˜σl−1T l =
kl
kl + 1− σl
Nlθ
σl−1
l +N
∗
Xlθ
∗σl−1
Xl
Nl +N∗Xl
, θ˜∗σl−1T l =
kl
kl + 1− σl
N∗l θ
∗σl−1
l +NXlθ
σl−1
Xl
N∗l +NXl
,(18)
in which NXl and N
∗
Xl are, respectively, the domestic and foreign numbers of ex-
porters. After knowing the exporting productivity cut-offs of domestic and for-
eign firms in industry l, it’s easy for us to find the productivity distributions µXl(θ)
and µ∗Xl(θ) of domestic and foreign exporters. When Gl(θ) adopts the form given
in (3), we can conclude the expressions of θ˜σl−1T l and θ˜
∗σl−1
T l from (18) and solve θ
σl−1
Xl
and θ∗σl−1Xl , respectively, as follows:
θ∗σl−1Xl =
κl
fl
(
ρl̟
∗
l
̟l
)σl−1
θσl−1l , θ
σl−1
Xl =
κl
fl
(
ρl̟l
̟∗l
)σl−1
θ∗σl−1l . (19)
Moreover, we have
P σll Ql =
flτ
σl−1
l
1− ρl
(
̟l
ρl
)σl−1
θ1−σll , P
∗σl
l Q
∗
l =
flτ
σl−1
l
1− ρl
(
̟∗l
ρl
)σl−1
θ∗1−σll . (20)
When a firm exports, its optimal capital and labor inputs are
KX =
[
ρlP
∗
l Q
∗
1
σl
l τ
1−σl
l θ
ρl̟−ρll
]σl ( rl
αl
)
−1
, (21)
LX =
[
ρlP
∗
l Q
∗
1
σl
l τ
1−σl
l θ
ρl̟−ρll
]σl (w
αl
)
−1
.
UnderAssumption 1, only the capitalmarket clears. Hence according to the clear-
ing condition of the capital market (20) and (21), we have
rl
αl
=
ρlklK¯
−1
l τ
σl−1
l
(1− ρl)(kl + 1− σl)
[
flNl + τ
1−σl
l κlNXl
]
, (22)
r∗l
αl
=
ρlklK¯
∗−1
l τ
σl−1
l
(1− ρl)(kl + 1− σl)
[
flN
∗
l + τ
1−σl
l κlN
∗
Xl
]
.
When Gl(θ) adopts the form given by (3), we can get an incumbent’s ex ante ex-
porting probability in industry l as follows:
ςl =
NXl
Nl
=
1−Gl(θXl)
1−Gl(θl)
=
(
θl
θXl
)kl
=
[
κl
fl
(
ρl̟l
̟∗l
)σl−1]− klσl−1 ( θl
θ∗l
)kl
. (23)
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Then the ex ante expected profit that a firm enters into the market is:
π¯l = π¯Dl(θ˜l) + ςlπ¯Xl(θ˜Xl), (24)
where π¯Dl is the firm’s expected profit from selling domestically, and π¯Xl is its ex-
pected profit from selling in the foreign market. We thus have
π¯l =
σl − 1
kl + 1− σl
(fl + ςlτ
1−σl
l κl), π¯Xl =
σl − 1
kl + 1− σl
τ 1−σll κl. (25)
The sum of expenditures on industry l from both countries is equal to that of
all the firms’ profits in this industry in both countries. Therefore, we have
flNl + τ
1−σl
l κlNXl + flN
∗
l + τ
1−σl
l κlN
∗
Xl =
kl + 1− σl
σl − 1
βl(w + w
∗). (26)
Moreover, suppose that the probability that a domestic firm in industry l exits the
market is δl. Thenwe have (1−Gl(θl))π¯l/δl = Fl for the long-term entry condition,
from which we have
flNl + τ
1−σl
l κlNXl =
kl + 1− σl
(σl − 1)b
kl
l
Nlθ
kl
l . (27)
(27) implies that a firm’s ex ante exporting probability (equal to NXl
Nl
) is increasing
in the productivity cut-off θl of entry into industry l. Combining (27) with that of
the foreign country, we can finally get
Ωl
∆
=
(
θl
θ∗l
)kl
=
fl − τ
1−σl
l κl
(
κl
fl
ρσl−1l
)
−
kl
σl−1
(
̟l
̟∗
l
)kl
fl − τ
1−σl
l κl
(
κl
fl
ρσl−1l
)
−
kl
σl−1
(
̟∗
l
̟l
)
−kl
. (28)
(28) implies that Ωl is decreasing in w if ωl
∆
= ̟l/̟
∗
l is increasing in w. This to-
gether with (23) yields the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 1, if ωl is increasing in the domestic minimumwage
w, then ςl is decreasing inw. That is, the increase of theminimumwage leads to the
decrease of firms’ ex ante exporting probability.
Proof. See the appendix.
The economicmeaning of Lemma 1 is straightforward. If the relative unit pro-
duction cost of the home country to the foreign one increases with the domestic
minimum wage in industry l, then the relative variety price of the home country
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will increase, and thus domestic firms’ competitive powers and their foreign sale
profits will decrease. This further makes lower-productivity domestic firms exit
the exporting market. Therefore, domestic firms’ ex ante exporting probability
decreases with the domestic minimumwage.
From (23), we have NXl = Nlςl, N
∗
Xl = N
∗
l = ς
∗
l . Substituting (19 ) into (20)
and (18), we can get a two-equation system ofNl andN
∗
l . SubstitutingNXl = Nlςl,
N∗Xl = N
∗
l = ς
∗
l into the above system, we can find the expressions of Nl and N
∗
l
(see (38) and (39) in the appendix). Further, according to (26) and (27), we can
finally get the following results:
θkll =
βlb
kl
l
δlFEl
w + w∗
Nl +N
∗
l Ω
−1
l
, θ∗kll =
βlb
kl
l
δlFEl
w + w∗
NlΩl +N∗l
. (29)
Applying (38) and (39) in the appendix, we can prove the following lemma.
Lemma 2 θ∗l is increasing in w.
Proof. See the appendix.
Lemma 29 indicates that the increase of the domestic minimum wage will
force the low-productivity domestic firms to exit the market, which increase the
average productivity of exporting incumbents in the home country. This further
forces those low-productivity firms in the foreign country to exit the market. And
thus the exporting productivity cut-off in the foreign country increases.
Finally, to find how the increase of the domestic minimumwage affects firms’
exporting behaviors in the home country, we need to know the relationship be-
tween ̟l
̟∗
l
and w. According to (22) , (27) and the definitions of ̟l and ̟
∗
l , we
have:
̟l
̟∗l
=
( w
w∗
)1−αl (K¯∗l
K¯l
)αl ( Nlθkll
N∗l θ
∗kl
l
)αl
=
( w
w∗
)1−αl (K¯∗l
K¯l
)αl (Nl
N∗l
Ωl
)αl
. (30)
Using (30), we can analyze the relationship between ̟l
̟∗
l
and w
w∗
and prove the fol-
lowing result.
Lemma 3 Under Assumption 1, ̟l
̟∗
l
is increasing in the relative wage w
w∗
. That is,
the increase of the gap between the domestic minimum wage and the foreign one
will increase the difference between the domestic and the foreign unit production
cost for each industry.
Proof. See the appendix.
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Lemma 3 indicates that the increase of the domestic minimum wage has d-
ifferent impacts on domestic and foreign industrial unit production costs - the
former increases more faster than the latter. This result coincides with our intu-
ition.
4.2 The impact of theminimumwage on firms’ exports
According to the expression ofM∗Xl, (20) implies that the increase of the domes-
tic minimumwage will increase industrial exporting productivity cut-offs. More-
over, by (20) and (16), if a firm exports, its exporting sale is
Xl =
fl
1− ρl
(
̟∗l
̟l
)σl−1( θ
θ∗l
)σl−1
. (31)
From Lemma 3,
̟∗
l
̟l
is increasing in w, given the foreign minimumwage w∗. From
Lemma2, θ∗l is increasing inw. Hence by (31) and Lemma1, we have the following
main proposition of this paper.
Proposition 2 In the open economy and under Assumption 1, the increase of the
domestic minimum wage will decrease firms’ ex ante exporting probabilities and
exporting sales. Moreover, firms’ exporting sales increase with their productivity
levels.
It’s necessary to briefly illustrate Proposition 2. First, it implies that firms’ ex
ante exporting possibilities and their exporting sales are all increasing in their
productivity, which coincideswith the theoretical result proposed inMelitz (2003)
andmany other empirical literatures. Second, as the main result in the paper, the
increase of the domestic minimum wage will decrease firms’ ex ante exporting
possibilities and their exporting sales. This result is easy to understand. On the
one hand, the increase of the domestic minimumwagemay change the structure
of comparative advantages between the two countries, so that the home country
uses capitals while the foreign country uses labors more intensely. This increas-
es prices of capitals and thus those of firms’ exporting varieties. On the other
hand, the increase of the domestic minimumwage will increase the home coun-
try’s demands for varieties of the foreign country and thus increases their prices.
The synthetic effect is that the difference between the two countries’ industrial
unit production costs increases. Because of the same reason, the increase of the
domestic wage will select low-productivity domestic firms out of the exporting
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markets, and thus increase industrial exporting productivity cut-offs in the home
country. This further lowers firms’ ex ante exporting probabilities.
5 Empirical models
According to (31) and the fact that capital interests are affected by industrial cap-
ital stocks, we know that firms’ productivity, the minimum wages and industrial
capital stocks all affect firms’ exporting behaviors. In this section, we test their
impacts on firms’ exports using firm-level data from Annual Survey of Chinese
Industrial Firms. We first estimate firms’ productivity, and then regress firms’ ex-
porting choices and exports with regard to their productivity, theminimumwage,
industrial capital stocks and other control variables.
5.1 Estimation of firm-level productivity
By Proposition 2, firms export more if their productivity is higher. Therefore,
to analyze firms’ exporting behaviors, we shall first estimate their productivity.
Many methods have been developed to estimate firm-level productivity, such as
theOlley-Pakes approach (OP)proposed byOlley andPakes (1996), the Levinsohn-
Petrin approach (LP) developed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), the ordinary
least square method (OLS) and the fixed effect model (FE). In this paper, we fol-
low strictly the idea of theMelitzmodel (Melitz 2003), which assumes that a firm’s
productivity is constant over all periods if it is in the market when the econo-
my attains its stationary state. This implies that we shall apply the FE method to
estimate firms’ productivity. We don’t use the popular OP approach because of
the following several reasons. First, the OP method also implicitly assumes that
firms’ productivity does not change over time (Tian and Yu, 2011). However, it
considers the impacts of firms’ exporting states, capital stocks and productivity
expectations on firms’ productivity. As we consider only firms’ productivity when
the economy attaints its stationary state, it is not necessary to use the OPmethod
to estimate firms’ productivity. Second, to use the OP method, the form of firms’
investment functions shall be specified in advance, whose choices will affect the
estimation results of firms’ productivity for the same dataset. Third, as shown in
Sun et al. (2011), the productivity-estimation results from the LPmethod and the
FEmodel aremore similar, while those from the OLS and the OPmethod are sim-
ilar. This is also the reason we apply the FE model but not the OLS and the LP
methods to estimate firms’ productivity.
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Supposewemeasure a firm’s total factor productivity (TFP) by Solow’s residual
and the firm’s production function is Ylit = θliK
αl
litL
1−αl
lit , then we can estimate the
capital-output elasticity αl of industry l by estimating the following equation:
lnYlit − lnLlit = ln θli + αl(lnKlit − lnLlit) + µlit, (32)
where θli is the productivity of firm i in industry l, Ylit, Klit and Llit are firm i’s
output, capital and labor inputs, respectively. Given the estimated value αˆl of αl,
we can calculate the firm’s productivity in period t, as follows:
θˆlit =
Ylit
K αˆllitL
1−αˆl
lit
. (33)
Another method to estimation firms’ productivity is to divide the time-period
1998-2007 into 5 time intervals, which is called 5-period method in this paper.
Thismethod has the following advantages relative to the above one. First, it seizes
the changes of a firm’s productivity over periods. Second, it does not affect the es-
timation of the capital-output elasticities as we can eliminate firms’ productivity
fixed effects by differentiating the two neighboring-period equations. Substitut-
ing the estimated capital-output elasticities into (33), we can calculate 5 produc-
tivity levels for each firm i in each industry l. We then take their average as firm
i’s constant productivity level in industry l.
5.2 Firms’ exporting behaviors
According to (31), our estimation equations of firms’ exporting behaviors are as
follows:
DXrlit = τr + ηl + γi + λt + ξ ln K¯lt + ψ lnwrt + ζ ln θˆrlit + ϕZrlit + εrlit, (34)
lnXrlit = τr + ηl + γi + λt + ξ ln K¯rlt + ψ lnwt + ζ ln θˆrlit + ϕZrlit + εrlit, (35)
where Equation (34) and (35) correspond to firms’ exporting choices and export-
ing sale, K¯rlt and wrt measures industrial capital stock and minimum wage in re-
gion r in period t, θˆrlit is the estimated productivity of firm i in industry l in region
r in period t, λt, ηl, γi and τr are, respectively, time, industry, firm and region fixed
effects, Zrlit is a vector containing firm i’ characteristic variables, including its
capital-debt ratio, inventory-output ratio, per-output profit and other firm-level
control variables, DXrlit is a dummy of firm i’ exporting state, with 1 for exporter
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and 0 for non-exporter, andXrlit is firm i’s exporting sale in period t, r, l, i, t are re-
gion, industry, firm and time indices , respectively. We can apply the LPMmodel,
the Probit model and the Logit model to estimate (34), whose estimation results
are similar. In this paper, we apply only the LPMmodel based on panel data and
the consideration of eliminating firm fixed effects.
5.3 Data descriptions
This paper applies plant-level data from the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms
(ASIF) cross-sectional data collected by the National Bureau of Statistics of China
between 1998 and 2007 to test Proposition 2. The data set contains detailed infor-
mation (includingmore than 100 financial variables listed in themain accounting
sheets of these firms) for all state-owned and non-state firms above a designated
scale (above 5million RMB) in 40 industries indexed from6 to 46, with industry 38
vacant (see Table 3 in the appendix for the industry codes and their correspond-
ing names). The data set exploited in this paper covers every firm’s output value,
value added, capital stock, labor hired, domestic sale value, exporting sale, in-
ventories, scale type, exporting status, operational status, ownership, age, wages,
other main financial variables, etc., between 1998 and 2007, in each industry. We
dropped those samples which does not follow standard accounting principles,
those which are public institutions, government entities, nongovernmental orga-
nizations and private nonbusiness firms, those which are not on business.
We also collect data of minimum wage standards and other macroeconomic
variables of Chinese cities from 1998 to 2007. As there is no a uniformly statis-
tical origin, we collect data of city minimum wages from websites and statistical
bulletins of local governments. This leads to the losses of some cities’ minimum
wages. Finally, we get totally 1240 minimum wages, covering 37.13% of total 334
prefecture-cities (autonomous prefectures or prefectures) all around China. We
also collect domestic gross values, populations, average annual wages, average
employments and othermacroeconomic variables of these cities. Wematch firm-
level data with city-level data by firms’ location information and match those
samples with both firm-level data and city minimumwages. We finally get totally
960 thousand samples.
Table 1 in the appendix describes the variables used in this paper. We see in
the table that the mean of city minimumwages is 532 yuan, which is around 40%
of the per capita wage of the samples, and there are 27.6% of exporters among
the samples, whose average exporting sale is 2.156 million yuan. The samples’
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capitals are larger than their debts and their inventories occupy 33% of their gross
values.
5.4 Regression results
5.4.1 Firms’ productivity
Table 2 in the appendix gives the estimation results of capital-output elasticities
of all industries. Themeanof them is about 0.56, which is close to those estimated
bymany literatures. The capital-output elasticities of labor-intense industries are
relatively smaller, such as industry 20 (0.38), 21 (0.39), 17 (0.49), 18 (0.48), where
the number in the ”()” is the corresponding capital-output elasticity in the indus-
try. However, those in the capital-intense industries are relatively larger, such as
industry 7 (0.87), 16 (0.88), 40 (0.7) and 45 (0.74). The mean of the capital-output
elasticity of all industries increased from 0.54 in 1998 to 0.58 in 2005, and then
decreased to 0.56 in 2007.
Table 3 shows the estimated industrial capital-output elasticities applyingpanel-
data regressions. Similarly, the average capital-output elasticity in industry 7 is
the highest at 0.9, while those in industry 20 and 21 are the lowest at 0.39. Fig-
ure 1 shows the two results estimated by the full-periodmethod and the 5-period
method, which are very close. In the sequel, we regress (35) applying the two
kinds of firm-level productivity calculated using the two kinds of estimated in-
dustrial capital-output elasticities to avoid errors caused by different estimation
method of capital-output elasticity.
5.4.2 Firms’ exporting choices and sales
Table 4 in the appendix shows the estimation results of (34) using the fixed-effect
model. The second column shows that the city minimum wage has significan-
t impact on a firm’s exporting possibility, which decreases by 1.5% if it doubles.
Moreover, the exporting possibility of a firm decreases by 1.3% if its productivity
decreases by 100%. Industrial capital stock has little influence on firms’ export-
ing possibilities, which is only significant at 10% level. The third column shows
the regression result by adding firm-level control variables to the regression of the
first column, which does not change much. The fourth column shows the regres-
sion result by adding city-level macroeconomic (including city GDP, population,
average annual income and employment) variables to the regression of the third
column to eliminate the endogeneity of city minimum wages when time varies.
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Figure 1: Average industrial capital-output elasticities estimated by the full-
period method and the 5-period method
It shows that the result is still constant to the previous ones. The fifth column
shows the regression result of the fourth column but we replace firms’ productivi-
ty by that estimated using the 5-periodmethod. It shows that the result holds very
closely to that given in the fourth column. This implies that estimation methods
of firm-level productivity has few impacts on the regression results.
The regression results of (35) using the fixed-effect model are shown in Table
5 in the appendix. It’s shown in the secpmd column that city minimum wage
decreases firms’ exporting sales, which is only significant at 10% level. A firm’s ex-
porting sale decreases by 0.086% if its cityminimumwage increases by 1%. A firm’s
productivity has significant influence on its exporting sale, with the latter increas-
ing by 0.69% if the former increases by 1%. Industrial capital stock has significant
effect on firms’ exports, with the latter increasing by 0.053% if the former increas-
es 1%. The third and the fourth column show the regression results controlling
firm-level control variables and city-level macroeconomic variables, respectively.
The influences of city minimumwages, firms’ productivity and industrial capital
stocks have very close impacts on firms’ exporting sales. This result estimated
by replacing firms’ productivity estimated using the 5-period method does not
change much than that shown in the fifth column.
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6 Conclusion
This paper constructs a trade-equilibriummodel with heterogeneous firms to in-
vestigate the impacts of minimumwages on firms’ exports. The results show that
the increase of the minimum wage in a country has negative influences on firm-
s’ ex ante exporting probabilities and their exporting sales. Empirical analysis
using firm-level data of Chinese enterprises confirms this theoretical result and
gives quantitative influences of the minimumwage on firms’ exports.
Based on the framework given in this paper, we can further analyze the wel-
fare effects of minimum wages in the open economy. We can also relax Assump-
tion 1 to investigate the impacts of minimum wages on firms’ exports when real
wages are affected by unemployment. As minimum wages affect firms’ organi-
zation and innovation behaviors and thus their productivity levels, it’s of sense
to explore the interaction effects between minimumwages and firms’ productiv-
ity. Moreover, the spatial differences of the impacts of minimumwages on firms’
exports deserve more researches.
PRODUCTIVITY HETEROGENEITY, MINIMUMWAGE AND FIRMS’ EXPORTS IN CHINA 21
References
Bernard, Andrew B., Jonathan Eaton, J. Bradford Jenson, and Smuel Kortum,
“Plants and Productivity in International Trade,” American Economic Review,
2003, 93(4), 1268–1290.
Bhagwati, J. N. and V. K. Ramaswami, “Domestic Distortions, Tariffs and the The-
ory of Optimum Subsidy,” Journal of Political Economy, 1963, 71, 44–50.
Brecher, Richard A., “MinimumWage Rates and the Pure Theory of International
Trade,”Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1974, 88(1), 98–116.
, “Optimal Commercial Policy for a Minimum-wage Economy,” Journal of In-
ternational Economics, 1974, 4, 139–149.
, “Increased Unemployment from Capital Accumulation in a Minimum-wage
Model of an Open Economy,” Canadian Journal of Economics, 1980, 13(1), 152–
158.
Egger, H., P. Egger, and J. R. Markusen, “International Welfare and Employment
Linkages Arising fromMinimumWages,”NBERWorking Paper Series No.15196,
2009, 27(1).
Flug, K. and O. Galor, “Minimum Wage in A General Equilibrium Model of In-
ternational Trade and Human Capital,” International Economic Review, 1986,
27(1), 149–164.
Haberler, G., “Some Problems in the Pure Theory of International Trade,” Eco-
nomic Journal, 1950, 60(238), 223–240.
Hagen, E., “An Economic Justification of Protectionism,” Quarterly Journal of E-
conomics, 1958, 72(4), 492–514.
Levinsohn, J. and A. Petrin, “Estimating production function using inputs to con-
trol for unobservables,” Review of Economic Studies, 2003, 70, 317–342.
Magee, P. S., International Trade andDistortions in FactorMarket, New York: Mar-
cel Dekker, 1976.
Melitz, Marc J., “The Impact of Trade on Intra-industry Reallocations and Aggre-
gate Industry Productivity,” Econometrica, 2003, 71(6), 1695–1725.
22 MA, SUN AND TIAN
Neary, J. Peter, “Intenational Factor Mobility, Minimum Wage Rates, and Factor-
price Equalization: A Synthesis,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1985, 100(3),
551–570.
Olley, Steven and Ariel Pakes, “The Dynamics of Productivity in the Telecommu-
nications quipment Industry,” Econometrica, 1996, 64(6), 1263–1297.
Schweinberger, Albert G., “Employment Subsidies and the Theory of Minimum
Wage Rates in General Equilibrium,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1978,
92(3), 361–374.
Sun, Churen, Guoqiang Tian, and Tao Zhang, “When Pareto Meets Melitz: the In-
applicability of the Melitz-Pareto Model for Chinese Firms,” mimeo, Shanghai
Institute of Foreign Trade, 2011.
Tybout, James R., “Plant and Firm Level Evidence on ’New’ Trade Theories,” in
E. Kwan Choi and James Harrigan, eds., Handbook of International Trade, UK:
Basil Blackwell, 2003.
PRODUCTIVITY HETEROGENEITY, MINIMUMWAGE AND FIRMS’ EXPORTS IN CHINA 23
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
We know that Nl andN
∗
l satisfy the following equations:
Nl +N
∗
l
(
κl
fl
ρσl−1l
)1− kl
σl−1
(
̟l
̟∗l
)kl+1−σl ( θl
θ∗l
)
−kl
=
kl + 1− σl
kl
(1− ρl)βlw
flτ
σl−1
l
,(36)
N∗l +Nl
(
κl
fl
ρσl−1l
)1− kl
σl−1
(
̟∗l
̟l
)σl−kl−1( θl
θ∗l
)kl
=
kl + 1− σl
kl
(1− ρl)βlw
∗
flτ
σl−1
l
,(37)
from which we can find the equilibrium numbers of firms in both countries as
follows:
Nl =
kl+1−σl
kl
(1−ρl)βl
flτ
σl−1
l
{
w −
(
κl
fl
ρσl−1l
)σl−1−kl
σl−1
(
̟l
̟∗
l
)kl+1−σl ( θl
θ∗l
)
−kl
w∗
}
1−
(
κl
fl
ρσl−1l
) 2(σl−1−kl)
σl−1
, (38)
N∗l =
kl+1−σl
kl
(1−ρl)βl
flτ
σl−1
l
{
w∗ −
(
κl
fl
ρσl−1l
)σl−1−kl
σl−1
(
̟l
̟∗
l
)σl−kl−1 ( θl
θ∗l
)kl
w
}
1−
(
κl
fl
ρσl−1l
) 2(σl−1−kl)
σl−1
. (39)
Proof of Lemma 2
First, we know that NlΩl is decreasing in w according to (38) . Hence
NlΩl
w+w∗
is also
decreasing in w. Furthermore, from (29), we have
N∗l
w + w∗
=
kl+1−σl
kl
(1−ρl)βl
flτ
σl−1
l
1−
(
κl
fl
ρσl−1l
) 2(σl−1−kl)
σl−1

1−

(κl
fl
ρσl−1l
)σl−1−kl
σl−1
(
̟l
̟∗l
)σl−kl−1
Ωl + 1

 w
w + w∗

 .
As w
w+w∗
is increasing in w,6,
N∗
l
w+w∗
is also decreasing in w. Therefore, from (29), we
know that
θ∗kll =
βlb
kl
l
δlFEl
NlΩl/(w + w∗) +N
∗
l /(w + w
∗)
is increasing in w. This implies that θ∗l is increasing in w.
6This is because that
(
̟l
̟∗
l
)σl−kl−1
and Ωl are both decreasing in
̟l
̟∗
l
.
24 MA, SUN AND TIAN
Proof of Lemma 3
First, from (38) and (39), we have
Nl
N∗l
=
w −
(
κl
fl
ρσl−1l
)σl−1−kl
σl−1 ωkl+1−σll Ω
−1
l w
∗
w∗ −
(
κl
fl
ρσl−1l
)σl−1−kl
σl−1 ωσl−1−kll Ωlw
. (40)
Second, equation (30) can be rewritten as
h(ωl) =
( w
w∗
)1−αl (K¯∗l
K¯l
)αl
,
where
h(ωl) = ωl

wΩl −
(
κl
fl
ρσl−1l
)σl−1−kl
σl−1 ωkl+1−σll w
∗
w∗ −
(
κl
fl
ρσl−1l
)σl−1−kl
σl−1 ωσl−1−kll Ωlw


−αl
. (41)
As
g(ωl) =
wΩl −
(
κl
fl
ρσl−1l
)σl−1−kl
σl−1 ωkl+1−σll w
∗
w∗ −
(
κl
fl
ρσl−1l
)σl−1−kl
σl−1 ωσl−1−kll Ωlw
is decreasing in ωl, h(ωl) is increasing in ωl. This implies that equation (30) has a
unique solution, which is increasing in w
w∗
.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of variables
Variable Unit Definition Mean
w Yuan Urban minimum wage standard
532.5
[150.7]
DX *100%
Adummymeasureswhether or not
a firm exports, with 1 if the firm ex-
ports and 0 if it does not
0.276
[0.44]
ln X
The natural logarithm of a firm’s
exporting sale
9.62
[1.72]
ln K¯
The natural logarithm of the total
capital stock in an industry
19.62
[1.16]
ln K
The natural logarithm of a firm’s
capital stock
9.76
[1.47]
RCD A firm’s total capital/its total debt
8.11
[498]
RInv *100%
A firm’s value of inventories/its to-
tal output value
0.325
[21.84]
RP
A firm’s sale profit/its total output
value
-0.038
[11.9]
DF *100%
A dummy measures whether
or not a firm’s capitals are all
from home\footnoteThis con-
cept includes state-owned firms,
collective firms, joint-equity coop-
erative enterprises, private firms
(including sole proprietorship
firms and private partnership
firms), etc. with 1 for yes and 0 for
no.
0.754
[0.430]
SC *100%
It’s 1 if a firm’s capitals are all or
partly from the state and 0 if not
0.109
[0.31]
UGdp 108 yuan
The GDP of the urban a firm lo-
cates
1140
[1326]
UPop 104 people
The population of the urban a firm
locates
228.4
[205.6]
UW Yuan
The average annual wage of the ur-
ban the firm locates
21414
[8580]
UE 104 people
The employment of the urban a fir-
m locates
51.56
[58.16]
Note: The value in ”[]” is the standard of the corresponding mean.
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Table 2: Estimation results of capital-output elasticities: OLSmethod
Industry
code
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
06 0.50 0.45 0.51 0.50 0.47 0.57 0.63 0.67 0.66 0.62
07 0.73 0.67 0.98 0.97 1.14 0.93 0.80 0.83 0.85 0.82
08 0.51 0.40 0.34 0.39 0.37 0.43 0.54 0.46 0.52 0.48
09 0.32 0.22 0.32 0.44 0.37 0.43 0.61 0.57 0.63 0.55
10 0.29 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.35 0.39 0.46 0.51 0.48 0.50
13 0.52 0.46 0.44 0.41 0.45 0.45 0.47 0.47 0.49 0.49
14 0.70 0.62 0.58 0.55 0.53 0.56 0.56 0.52 0.50 0.50
15 0.63 0.55 0.54 0.51 0.47 0.49 0.50 0.52 0.52 0.50
16 0.77 0.79 0.75 0.82 0.97 1.06 0.85 0.91 0.97 0.92
17 0.57 0.46 0.45 0.46 0.48 0.50 0.53 0.51 0.53 0.50
18 0.58 0.45 0.47 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.51 0.49 0.50 0.48
19 0.62 0.45 0.51 0.52 0.56 0.58 0.61 0.61 0.60 0.61
20 0.41 0.37 0.35 0.31 0.32 0.37 0.43 0.42 0.44 0.41
21 0.48 0.35 0.31 0.37 0.41 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.43 0.42
22 0.59 0.50 0.48 0.46 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.46 0.48 0.47
23 0.80 0.75 0.76 0.72 0.68 0.69 0.65 0.61 0.57 0.45
24 0.58 0.45 0.45 0.44 0.41 0.49 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.48
25 0.60 0.64 0.71 0.76 0.67 0.73 0.69 0.77 0.73 0.63
26 0.64 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.55 0.57 0.58 0.60 0.60 0.58
27 0.67 0.59 0.60 0.55 0.53 0.53 0.43 0.42 0.43 0.38
28 0.43 0.43 0.41 0.43 0.46 0.49 0.48 0.53 0.58 0.56
29 0.44 0.39 0.42 0.46 0.46 0.55 0.50 0.50 0.53 0.49
30 0.58 0.52 0.53 0.50 0.49 0.51 0.53 0.54 0.57 0.55
31 0.50 0.44 0.46 0.47 0.45 0.52 0.53 0.54 0.56 0.52
32 0.55 0.48 0.51 0.48 0.51 0.57 0.59 0.60 0.58 0.58
33 0.60 0.48 0.52 0.45 0.53 0.57 0.62 0.70 0.74 0.70
34 0.62 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.55 0.56 0.59 0.57
35 0.61 0.50 0.51 0.47 0.48 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.49
36 0.70 0.60 0.60 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.49
37 0.73 0.63 0.61 0.57 0.55 0.55 0.53 0.54 0.56 0.53
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39 0.92 0.87 0.58 0.60 0.64 0.62
40 0.72 0.64 0.60 0.56 0.55 0.59 0.62 0.62 0.64 0.64
41 0.75 0.71 0.70 0.63 0.61 0.65 0.60 0.60 0.62 0.60
42 0.81 0.70 0.68 0.59 0.60 0.51 0.52 0.54 0.55 0.55
43 0.64 0.57 0.52 0.47 0.76 0.65 0.60 0.65
44 0.70 0.71 0.69 0.63 0.66 0.68 0.70 0.70 0.65 0.58
45 0.73 0.81 0.86 0.84 0.79 0.77 0.62 0.65 0.66 0.66
46 0.63 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.65
Note: Refer to Table 3 for the name of the industries.
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Table 3: Estimation results of capital-output elasticities: fixed-effectmodel
Industry
code
Industry name
1998
-1999
2000
-2001
2002
-2003
2004
-2005
2006
-2007
06 Extraction coal 0.58 0.37 0.54 0.57 0.48
07
Petroleum and natural gas
extraction
0.72 1.15 1.00 0.72 0.93
08
ferrous metals mining and
dressing
0.73 0.45 0.52 0.58 0.56
09
Extraction non-ferrous met-
al
0.61 0.54 0.49 0.57 0.57
10 Extraction nonmetallic ore 0.61 0.44 0.50 0.47 0.53
13 Food processing 0.54 0.43 0.52 0.51 0.55
14 Food manufacturing 0.62 0.63 0.49 0.58 0.56
15 BeverageManufacturing 0.55 0.44 0.53 0.55 0.58
16 Tobacco processing 0.58 0.66 0.57 0.52 0.80
17 Textile 0.62 0.51 0.48 0.56 0.58
18
Garments and other Fiber
Products manufacturing
0.67 0.55 0.45 0.55 0.52
19
Leather Furs Down and Re-
lated Products
0.77 0.55 0.50 0.53 0.52
20
Timber Processing, Bam-
boo, Cane, Palm Fiber and
Straw Products
0.50 0.44 0.44 0.54 0.51
21 Furniture Manufacturing 0.55 0.42 0.52 0.50 0.52
22
Papermaking and Paper
Products
0.63 0.38 0.51 0.49 0.56
23
Printing Industry and
Recording Media
0.55 0.45 0.51 0.64 0.54
24
Cultural Educational and S-
ports Goods
0.70 0.61 0.53 0.63 0.57
25 Petroleum Refining and Cok 0.57 0.42 0.63 0.55 0.53
26
Chemical materials and
chemical products
0.65 0.52 0.53 0.58 0.58
27
Pharmaceutical manufac-
turing
0.66 0.45 0.44 0.57 0.52
28
Chemical Fiber manufac-
turing
0.66 0.32 0.37 0.49 0.62
29 Rubber Products 0.62 0.43 0.43 0.56 0.54
30 Plastic product industry 0.65 0.55 0.49 0.59 0.60
31 Nonmetal Mineral Products 0.60 0.43 0.44 0.52 0.56
32
Ferrous metal smelting and
rolling processing
0.63 0.44 0.44 0.52 0.61
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33
Non-Ferrous Metals Smelt-
ing and Rolling
0.58 0.48 0.51 0.54 0.59
34 Metal product industry 0.65 0.51 0.46 0.60 0.59
35 Machine building industry 0.64 0.55 0.54 0.52 0.59
36
General Equipment manu-
facturing
0.70 0.56 0.54 0.55 0.60
37
Transport Equipment man-
ufacturing
0.68 0.50 0.49 0.59 0.56
39
Arms and ammunition
manufacturing
0.98 0.59 0.61
40
Electric Equipment andMa-
chinery manufacturing
0.64 0.50 0.12 0.65 0.65
41
Electronic and Telecommu-
nication Equipment manu-
facturing
0.71 0.52 0.55 0.64 0.59
42
Instrumentation and cul-
ture, office machinery
manufacturing
0.73 0.67 0.19 0.57 0.53
43
Recovery and processing of
waste resources and materi-
als
0.71 0.30 0.72 0.56
44
Production and supply of
electric power and heat
power
0.58 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.55
45
Production and supply of
gas
0.69 0.62 0.41 0.30 0.52
46
Production and supply of
water
0.45 0.27 0.35 0.19 0.35
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Table 4: Firms’ export choices: LPM-FEmodel
Dependant: DX
(1) (2) (3) (4)7
ln w -0.015 -0.016 -0.011 -0.011
[3.37]*** [4.09]*** [2.70]*** [2.76]***
ln θ 0.013 0.016 0.016 0.011
[16.96]*** [26.17]*** [25.96]*** [19.58]***
ln K¯ 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001
[1.85] ** [1.58] ** [1.26] [0.60]
ln K 0.028 0.028 0.027
[38.23]*** [38.22]*** [37.14]***
RCD -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
[1.31] [0.60] [0.63]
RInv -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
[4.20]*** [4.18]*** [4.70]** *
RP 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.80] [0.79] [0.83]
DF -0.035 -0.035 -0.035
[10.14]*** [9.85]*** [9.87]***
SC 0.005 0.004 0.004
[1.79] * [1.71] * [1.62] *
lnUGdp -0.003 -0.004
[1.16] [1.45]
lnUPop 0.024 0.025
[10.24]*** [10.48]***
lnUW -0.023 -0.022
[6.84]*** [6.62]***
lnUE -0.018 -0.017
[6.84]*** [6.81]**
TimeDum Yes Yes Yes Yes
Const 0.290 0.074 0.221 0.251
[7.49]*** [2.35]** [5.27]*** [5.99]***
PRODUCTIVITY HETEROGENEITY, MINIMUMWAGE AND FIRMS’ EXPORTS IN CHINA 31
Obs 954603 948983 934346 934346
R2ˆ 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Note: The value in ”[]” is the ”t-statistics” of the corresponding estimated value[ff0c]”***”,
”**”, ”*” represent, respectively, that the corresponding estimated value are significant at
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 5: Firms’ exporting sales: fixed-effectmodel
Dependant: ln X
(1) (2) (3) (4)8
ln w -0.042 -0.100 -0.086 -0.108
[1.59]* [4.05]*** [3.39]*** [4.09]***
lnθ 0.691 0.754 0.756 0.522
[162.66] *** [185.01]*** [183.23]*** [143.50]***
ln K¯ 0.053 0.041 0.041 0.022
[7.41]*** [5.99]*** [5.98]*** [3.01]***
ln K 0.646 0.646 0.625
[141.33] *** [139.70]*** [130.22]***
RCD -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
[0.45] [0.42] [0.73]
RInv -0.016 -0.015 -0.033
[6.04]*** [5.63]*** [12.10]***
RP -0.017 -0.017 -0.024
[3.61]*** [3.42]*** [4.81]***
DF -0.019 -0.023 -0.023
[1.07] [1.26] [1.23]
SC 0.047 0.047 0.030
[2.84]*** [2.79]*** [1.74] *
lnUGdp -0.105 -0.122
[6.88]*** [7.72]***
lnUPop 0.006 0.014
[0.57] [1.25]
lnUW 0.029 0.066
[1.31] [2.85]***
lnUE 0.170 0.179
[10.34]*** [10.50]***
TimeDum Yes Yes Yes Yes
Const 7.118 1.179 0.782 1.750
[36.33]*** [6.21]*** [2.87]*** [6.19]***
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Obs 263215 262227 258515 258515
R2ˆ 0.22 0.31 0.32 0.26
Note: The value in ”[]” is the ”t-statistics” of the corresponding estimated value. ”***”,
”**”, ”*” represent, respectively, that the corresponding estimated value are significant at
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
